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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Recommendation, and the accompanying Order filed July 15, 2011. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellant Joseph Henry brought his case against the Defendants, Department of 
Corrections and the State Insurance Fund, to determine whether Mr. Henry's heart attack 
suffered on November 15, 2009 was caused by an accident in the course and scope of his 
employment, among othcr issues. The Industrial Commission found the testimony of Mr. 
Henry's treating cardiologist insufficient to establish the required causal relationship between 
Mr. Henry's employment and the November 15, 2009 heart attack. The Industrial Commission's 
finding on this threshold issue rendered the remaining issues moot and therefore unaddressed. 
Mr. Henry thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal on July 29,2011. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACT 
The undisputed facts relevant to this appeal are as follows: Claimant, Joseph Henry, 
worked as a prison guard at the Idaho State Correctional Institution since 2001. On November 
15, 2009, Mr. Henry suffered a heart attack after arriving at the prison in the early morning 
hours. Mr. Henry had never suffered any symptoms related to a heart attack prior to November 
15, 2009 (R p. 1 0, ~~ 1-2) and prior testing had ruled out occlusion of his coronary arteries. (See, 
Parent Depo., pp. 73-74). 
In the early morning hours of November 15, 2009, Mr. Henry drove from Caldwell to the 
prison. Once there, Mr. Henry passed through a series of checkpoints and walked into the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PG. 1 
Administration building. After check-in procedures, Mr. Henry left the Administration building 
and hurriedly walked approximately 400 yards in the cold morning air to the building that 
housed Unit 15. Once inside Unit 15, Mr. Henry began sweating profusely and had a strange 
appearance. Mr. Henry sat down in the control room to rest but his symptoms escalated to 
include pain in his arm and chest heaviness. Mr. Henry requested medical help and was 
transported by ambulance to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. (R pp. 11-15, ~~ 6-14). 
Once at the hospital, Cardiologist Mark G. Parent M.D. diagnosed Mr. Henry with an 
"acute posterolateral myocardial infarction due to a blockage of the right circumflex obtuse 
marginal artery." (R p. 15, ~ 15). Mr. Henry promptly underwent an emergency operation in 
which Dr. Parent placed a stent in the occluded artery. During this surgery, Dr. Parent observed 
an additional occlusion in a separate artery, but noted that this second blockage was bypassed 
through collateralization1 by other vessels. Dr. Parent initially thought that this second occluded 
artery was not contributing to Mr. Henry's symptoms. (R pp. 15-16, ~ 15). 
Following the successful placement of a stent in Mr. Henry's right marginal artery, Mr. 
Henry experienced continued chest pain. Nevertheless, Dr. Parent found Mr. Henry to be 
hemodynamically stable and authorized Mr. Henry's discharge from the hospital on November 
17,2009. (R p. 16, ~ 15). 
On November 25, 2009, just ten days after his heart attack, Mr. Henry underwent a 
cardiac stress test. While on the treadmill, Mr. Henry suffered another cardiac event, which 
1 Collateralizationis the process by which two or more capillariesjoin together to form an alternate pathway for the 
flow of blood. It is a process where "you can have one artery actually supporting and supplying an artery with blood 
that's totally occluded." (Parent Depo. p. 12:23-25). 
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ultimately led to triple bypass surgery on November 26, 2009. After recovering from this second 
heart surgery, Mr. Hemy attempted light duty at the prison, but ultimately resigned in March of 
20l0.(Rp.16,~16-l7). 
Prior to hearing, both parties herein communicated with Claimant's treating physician, 
Dr. Mark Parent, with regard to the cause of Claimant's heart attack and subsequent cardiac 
difficulty. On April 6, 2010, Claimant's attorney wrote to Dr. Parent and asked him to consider 
whether or not Claimant's work activities immediately before his heart attack were a factor in 
causing his heart attack. In this letter, Claimant's counsel supplied Dr. Parent additional factual 
information which was lacking from his medical records. (See, Joint Exhibit No. 13, pp. 1-2). 
In response, Dr. Parent wrote back to Claimant's counsel, recounting the details of 
Claimant's work activities on the morning of his heart attack and opined as follows: 
"You have asked me in my opinion whether or not Mr. Hemy's 
activities of that morning, getting to work were a factor in causing 
his heart attack, and knowing these other details of the 
temperature, the time of day, the activity level and the mental 
stress he was under, I think it is quite likely that these factors 
contributed to his myocardial infarction that day." 
(See, Joint Exhibit No. 12, p. 9). 
In preparation for the hearing, Defendants' attorney also wrote to Dr. Parent. That letter 
is included in the record in Joint Exhibit No. 13, pp. 3-6. In this letter, the Defendants' attorney 
recounted Claimant's health history and made mention of Claimant's use of a C-Pap machine for 
a sleep disorder, his chronic anxiety, his high cholesterol difficulties, his use of Viagra, his 
tobacco abuse and his alcohol intake. After recounting these prior health troubles, defense 
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counsel recounted the activities the Claimant was engaged in immediately prior to his heart 
attack and asked a series of questions of Dr. Parent taking into account all of the preexisting 
health difficulties. Dr. Parent responded by discussing these prior health difficulties and the 
affect of the Claimant's activities on the morning of his heart attack and summarized as follows: 
"A likely trigger for heart attacks is often early morning exertion 
under cold temperatures along with the stress and anxiety of going 
to work. As you know, Mr. Henry has had a very difficult time 
handling daily life stressors and has required treatment with 
anxiolytics and antidepressants for a number of years. I would 
think that the patient had a 50% contribution to his myocardial 
infarction from his long standing risk factors mentioned above and 
50% due to the acute provoking risk factors of early morning 
walking in cold weather to work." 
(See, Joint Exhibit No. 12, pp. 2-4). 
At hearing, Claimant testified about his work activities and the onset of his heart atack 
and the parties then thereafter adjourned to take the deposition of Dr. Parent on March 4, 2011. 
During Dr. Parent's deposition, he once again discussed Claimant's prior risk factors for heart 
attack and the activities which proceeded his heart attack as Claimant got to work on the morning 
of November 15,2009. Dr. Parent testified that in his opinion, Claimant's activities of exertion 
in cold weather immediately prior to his heart attack were a factor in causing his heart attack on 
the morning of November 15, 2009. (See, Dr. Parent Depo., p. 44). Again, on cross 
examination, Dr. Parent testified that Claimant's activities on the morning of November 15, 
2009, contributed to the onset of his heart attack on that date. Dr. Parent certified that he held 
this opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability. (See, Dr. Parent Depo., p. 49, 11. 1-
11 ). 
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Dr. Parent also reiterated his opinion that the work-related activities were not the sole 
cause but were a 50% contributing cause to the triggering of Claimant's heart attack. (See, Dr. 
Parent Depo., p. 50, 11. 1-25, p. 51,11. 1-5). 
In addition, Dr. Parent was asked about different scenarios and the importance of other 
factors including the fact that Claimant might have looked ill on the morning of his heart attack 
and might have been exposed to cold weather at his home prior to leaving for work. Dr. Parent 
testified that in assessing major stressors and minor stressors, the decisions are very difficult and 
although some other minor stressors may have been involved, he stuck by his opinion on 
causation. (See, Dr. Parent Depo., pp. 51-55). 
In summary, Dr. Parent testified that Claimant's artery appeared to be fine based upon the 
medical evidence when he was driving to work that morning from Caldwell to Boise and that, as 
far as he could tell, it closed up when Claimant was walking up stairs at work and that the 
symptoms hit him very suddenly. (See, Dr. Parent Depo., p. 55, 11. 15-20). 
Dr. Parent explained that when a person has an artery that clogs suddenly, symptoms 
corne on very suddenly and a person can go from feeling just fine to appearing gray and ashen in 
a very short time. Likewise, Dr. Parent testified that when that artery is treated and cleared, the 
resumption of normal symptoms can be very dramatic. Dr. Parent explained that Claimant in 
this case was very much like that and had a very dramatic response when the clogged artery was 
opened and reported a cessation of pain and a very dramatic and sudden relief of his symptoms. 
Dr. Parent explained that this was part of the rationale for the opinion which he had expressed. 
(See, Dr. Parent Depo., pp. 54-55). 
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It should be remembered that Dr. Mark Parent was the only cardiologist who testified in 
this case and the only physician who offered an opinion on the causation element of this case. 
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IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law by requiring the Claimant to 
rule out all possible causes of his November 15, 2009 heart attack in order to meet his 
burden of proof on causation. 
2. Whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Industrial Commission's denial 
of benefits to Claimant. 
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V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the Supreme Court reviews the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by 
the Industrial Commission, the Court exercises free review of questions of law, but reviews 
questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the 
Commission's findings. Hughen v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 
(2002). Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion. Id. Finally, unless clearly erroneous, the Commission's 
determinations of credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed. Id. 
As a matter of policy, the Court "must liberally construe the provisions of the workers' 
compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for which the 
law was promulgated." Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 345, 109 P.3d 1084, 1087 
(2005). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction. 
Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87,88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission ("Commission") denied Mr. Henry's claim for workers' 
compensation benefits based on an erroneous legal standard. Specifically, the Commission 
discredited the only medical testimony in this case on the basis that the medical testimony did 
not narrow causation to a single work-related factor. Even if this Court were to find that the 
Commission applied the appropriate legal standard, the Commission's denial was not based on 
substantial and competent evidence. More precisely, the Commission discredited the testimony 
of Dr. Parent without a substantial and competent basis in the record. 
A. The Industrial Commission committed reversible error by requiring the Claimant 
to rule out all possible causes for his November 15,2009 heart attack. 
Paragraph 41 of the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation ("Decision") sets forth the basis for discrediting the testimony of Cardiologist 
Mark Parent M.D., the only medical expert to testify in this case. The finding reads as follows: 
(R p. 28, ~ 41). 
"The Referee finds Dr. Parent's testimony insufficient to establish 
that any of Claimant's activities at his workplace on November 15, 
2009 triggered his heart attack because he failed to rule out the 
earlier morning activities. He acknowledged that he should have 
considered Claimant's earlier activities including getting into a 
cold car, gripping a cold steering wheel and driving though traffic 
to get to work but, nevertheless, he did not. To the extent Dr. 
Parent's opinion relies upon Claimant's exertional activities at 
work to establish an industrial accident, it is materially flawed 
because it fails to rule out Claimant's prior exertional activities that 
morning." 
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Claimant contends that this finding, which effectively imposes a burden on Claimant to 
prove that his industrial accident is the only cause for his accident and that all other causes are 
noncontributory, is a misstatement of law. 
To prevail in a worker's compensation claim, a Claimant need only prove "to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability [that] the injury for which benefits are claimed is 
causally related to an accident occurring in the course of employment." Wichterman v. JH 
Kelly, Inc., 144 Idaho 138, 141, 158 P.3d 301,304 (2007). 
While the Industrial Commission did cite to the language as set forth above, requiring a 
Claimant to prove causation by medical proof establishing causation to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability, the Industrial Commission's Decision violates established Idaho law by 
requiring Claimant to rule out all other possible causes in order to prevail. 
In the case of Bowman v. Twin Falls Construction Company, 99 Idaho 312,581 P.2d 770 
(1978), (overruled on other grounds by DeMain v. Bruce McLaughlin Logging, 132 Idaho 782, 
979 P.2d 655 (1999)), the Industrial Commission was concerned with medical causation in 
relation to a worker who claimed that his exposure to dust in the work place caused the 
development of pulmonary emphysema and, secondarily, congestive heart failure. In that case, it 
appeared that the Claimant Bowman was a heavy equipment operator who had worked for 
eighteen years in a job that exposed him to dusty conditions which he alleged was a causative 
factor in his development in pulmonary emphysema. After finding that the Claimant had proved 
that he was totally and permanently disabled, the Industrial Commission found that the 
Claimant's working conditions did contribute to the development of his emphysema but only to a 
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slight degree. The Industrial Commission therefore denied benefits to Claimant because he had 
not proven that the working conditions were a major contributing cause to the development of 
his disabling condition. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded and found that the Industrial 
Commission had erred in applying the law with regard to the Claimant's burden of proof. Citing 
to Hamlin v. University of Idaho, 61 Idaho 570, 576, 104 P.2d 625, 627 (1940), the Supreme 
Court noted that long established Idaho law held as follows: 
"Where injury results partly from accident and partly from 
preexisting disease, it is compensable if the accident hastened or 
accelerated the ultimate result, and it is immaterial that the 
Claimant would, even if the accident had not occurred have 
become totally disabled by the disease." 
See, Bowman, 99 Idaho at 315,581 P.2d at 773. 
Continuing, the Supreme Court in Bowman, set out the long established rationale for this 
reason as follows: 
"Nothing is better settled in compensation law than that the act 
takes the workman as they arrive at the plant gate. Some are weak 
and some are strong. Some, particularly as age advances, have a 
preexisting 'disease or condition' but some have not. No matter. 
All must work. They share equally the hazards of the press and 
their families astringencies of want, and they all, in our opinion, 
share equally in the protection of the act in the event of accident, 
regardless of their prior condition of health." 
Id. (Citing, Laird v. State Highway Dept., 80 Idaho 12, 232 P.2d 1079 (1958); Teater v. 
Dairyman's Cooperative Creamery, 69 Idaho 152, 190 P.2d 687 (1948); Nistad v. Winten 
Lumber Co., 61 Idaho 1,99 P.2d 52 (1940);1n re: Larson, 48 Idaho 136,279 P. 1087 (1929)). 
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The Supreme Court went on in Bowman to hold as follows: 
"Nor is the Commission required to seek out a distinction between 
those work-related contributing factors which are 'major' and 
those which are 'slight.' When one's employment aggravates, 
accelerates or 'lights up' a preexisting disease so that total 
permanent disability results, the employee is entitled by statute to 
100% disability benefits.. .. The Commission here did indulge in 
such a distinction, saying that 'the inhalation of dust during the 
Claimant's employment aggravated his pulmonary disease to a 
slight extent, ' but that 'it was not the underlying cause of the 
disease or a major aggravating factor.' The language of Beaver is 
applicable: 'mere predisposing physical condition does not affect 
the right to compensation.' It does not make any difference that 
the inhalation of dust during employment is slight rather than a 
major contributing cause of resultant total disability." 
Id. at316, 774. 
The finding of Bowman, applied to the facts of this case demonstrate that the Industrial 
Commission applied the wrong legal standard in making a judgment on the causation proof 
offered herein. Bowman stands for the proposition that if the Claimant offered proof to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability that the working conditions of the Claimant on the 
morning of his heart attack even slightly contributed to his heart attack, he is entitled to full 
compensation. As long as Claimant offers this proof to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability, the Claimant's proofis sufficient under the ruling of Bowman. 
Implicit in the Bowman ruling, as set forth above, is the idea that many health-related 
problems are multi-factorial in nature. The Bowman decision, as cited above, stands for the 
proposition that as long as a Claimant can demonstrate, to a reasonable degree of medical 
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probability, that his or her work has contributed to the health problem, even to a slight degree, 
the worker's compensation act has been satisfied and benefits will be awarded. 
In this case, the Industrial Commission violated the holding of Bowman in ruling the 
Claimant needed to rule out all other possible causes in order to present persuasive evidence on 
causation. The ruling of the Industrial Commission herein violates the standard set forth in 
Bowman and constitutes reversible error. 
In much the same way, when multiple causes may be responsible for an injury in the 
context of standard civil cases, Idaho has adopted the "substantial factor" test. In Newberry v. 
Martins, this Court explained the proper usage of the substantial factor test in analyzing 
causation. 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005). 
In Newberry, jury instructions as to causation were at issue in a medical malpractice case. 
Specifically, the dispute centered on whether a "but for" instruction versus a "substantial factor" 
instruction was proper. Id. This Court explained, "In short, the 'but for' test may be employed 
when there is a single possible cause, but when there are multiple possible causes of the 
plaintiff's injury a 'substantial factor' instruction must be given instead." Id. at 288. 
The substantial factor instruction, upheld in Newberry, reads as follows: 
"When I use the expression 'proximate cause,' I mean a cause 
which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the damage 
complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is 
a substantial factor concurring with some other cause acting at the 
same time, which in combination with it, causes the damage. 
A cause can be a substantial contributing cause even though the 
injury, damage or loss would likely have occurred anyway without 
that contributing cause. A substantial cause need not be the sole 
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factor, or even the primary factor in causing plaintiffs injuries, but 
merely a substantial factor therein." 
Id. at 287. (Emphasis Added). See also, Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819 (2007). 
In this case, Dr. Parent's testimony was discounted as "materially flawed" for failing to 
discount all other possible causal sources of Mr. Henry's heart attack. (R p. 28, ~ 41). Claimant 
contends that Dr. Parent's testimony, when analyzed in its entirety, satisfies both Bowman's 
slight factor test as well as Newberry's substantial factor test by affirmatively linking Mr. 
Henry's November 15, 2009 heart attack with the mental and physical stresses Mr. Henry faced 
after arriving at work. 
In its Decision, the Commission excerpted the deposition testimony of Dr. Parent at 
length. Indeed, the Commission noted in Paragraph 20 of its Decision that during direct 
examination, Dr. Parent stated that Claimant: 
"had a 50% contribution to his myocardial infarction from his 
longstanding risk factors mentioned above and 50% due to the acute 
provoking risk factors of early morning walking in the cold weather 
to work. Therefore, I would agree with you that it is equally likely 
that the heart attack could have been caused by either the 
longstanding risk factors that caused the development of an 
atherosclerotic plaque and then the triggering risk factors of that 
morning's activities." 
(R p. 13-14, ~ 20). 
Although the Commission apparently adopted Dr. Parent's 50% attribution to Claimant's 
workplace activities, the Commission nonetheless ruled against the Claimant for failing to rule out all 
other possible causes. Claimant would submit that Dr. Parent's testimony that multiple causes were 
responsible for Claimant's heart attack brings the causal analysis squarely under the purview of 
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either the slight risk test, or the substantial factor test. Under either test, a 50% contribution of work-
related factors would support a finding of medical causation to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability. 
Therefore, Claimant contends that the Commission committed reversible error by 
applying an inappropriate legal standard to the present case. Claimant contends that the 
testimony given by Dr. Parent satisfies either the slight risk or the substantial factor test. The 
Claimant is not required to show that the activities at work were the sole cause, or even a major 
cause, for his industrial accident as the two tests, cited above, demonstratc. Claimant thcrcfore 
contends that he is not required to rule out any and all other possible causes of his injury in order 
to present a prima facie case or a persuasive opinion. The law does not require that and 
Claimant respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter to the Industrial Commission 
for consideration under the appropriate legal standard. 
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B. The Industrial Commission's fmdings are not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence 
1. Claimant's burden of proof 
As with a Plaintiff in a standard civil case, the Claimant in a workers' compensation case 
bears the initial burden of proof to show that he is entitled to benefits. See, Cole v. Stokely Van 
Camp, 118 Idaho 173, 175,795 P.2d 872 (1990), Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473,849 P.2d 
934 (1993). In this case, the Commission found that the heart attack was an "accident" within 
the scope ofIdaho Code § 102(18)(b). (R p. 26, ~ 33). The Commission's Decision ultimately 
turned on whether the accident occurred while the Claimant was already at work, or on his way 
to work. As the Commission rightfully noted, "Claimant need not identify, with any great 
specificity, the time when and place where the accident occurred. All that Claimant is required 
to do is to reasonably locate the occurrence of the accident in time and space." (R p. 25, ~ 30). 
Claimant contends that he readily satisfied this burden through the following testimony of 
Dr. Parent: 
"And when an artery closes - to give you an example. When an 
artery closes, somebody goes from feeling absolutely fine to dead 
or almost dead, and then when that artery opens on the cath lab 
table, that gray ashen appearing and that pain goes away and their 
sweating stops. And they want sometimes to get up and go home, 
and ten minutes ago they were about dead. 
And so this process of being normal flow through that artery and 
everything is fine, to no flow through that artery and you're having 
a heart attack, to restoration and normal flow, can be in some 
people a very dramatic recovery. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PG. 16 
So you can go from being very unimpaired to being very impaired 
to being very unimpaired very rapidly sometimes. And Mr. Henry 
was a bit like that in the cath lab to me. He went from being 
diaphoretic, cold ashen to when that artery opened, to being, I feel 
good, I feel great, I'm so glad that pain's gone. So they recover 
very quickly. 
I don't think that artery was closed when he drove from 
Caldwell to Boise. I think it closed when we [sic] was walking 
up those stairs, and it hit him very suddenly." 
(Parent Depo. p. 54, 11. 20-25, p. 55, 11. 1-19.) (Emphasis Added). 2 
Claimant contends that this testimony substantially and competently supports a finding 
that Claimant's heart attack occurred after he had already arrived at work. Dr. Parent was able to 
reasonably locate the occurrence of the accident in time and space. In fact, based on Claimant's 
physical activities, mental stressors, and symptomology, the cardiologist was able to pinpoint the 
occurrence of the arterial occlusion to the time when Claimant was climbing the stairs of Unit 
15. Accordingly, Claimant contends that he satisfied his initial burden of showing that the 
accident at issue occurred after his arrival at work. 
2. Defendant'S burden - the risk of nonproduction 
Once a Claimant comes forward with sufficient evidence to suppOli a prima facie 
entitlement to benefits, the Defendant must present evidence or elicit testimony that contradicts 
or diminishes the Claimant's evidence. This evidentiary shift is clearly marked in the context of 
standard civil cases. "If the opponent's motion for a directed verdict is denied, he or she faces 
what is sometimes called the risk of nonproduction: if he or she produces no evidence, he or she 
2 Although the Industrial Commission's Decision incorporated a block quote with the doctor's response to questions 
of causation, the portion excerpted herein, which identifies the doctor's ultimate causal conclusion, was replaced by 
ellipses in the Commission's Decision. (See, Parent Depo. p. 54, 11.20-25, p. 55, 11. 1-19; but see R p. 22, ~ 22). 
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runs the risk that the [finder of fact] will find that the proponent has met the burden of 
persuasion." 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 183. 
This evidentiary shift of the burden of proof is plain in workers' compensation cases and 
is consistent with the shifting of the burden of proof in civil cases. In Spivey v. Novartis Seed 
Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002), the Claimant presented evidence that while sitting at a 
conveyor belt sorting seeds, she reached out to pick up a seed and felt a pop in her shoulder. 
Within a short time her shoulder became symptomatic and she was ultimately diagnosed with a 
rotator cuff tear. Her treating physician testified that the motion of reaching out to pick up the 
seed was enough to cause a rotator cuff tear in the setting of some pre-existing degenerative 
changes. The Defendant offered another doctor's testimony to the contrary and the Industrial 
Commission ultimately sided with the treating physician, finding that Claimant had proven a 
compensable case under the Worker's Compensation law. 
On appeal, the Court noted that after the Claimant had presented a prima facie case 
establishing that she was entitled to benefits, the burden of proof shifted to the Defendants to 
present evidence disproving the Claimant's case. 
"Spivey provided substantial and competent evidence to allow the 
Commission to conclude that she had suffered a compensable 
injury. The burden was on the Appellants to present evidence that 
showed the injury was personal to Spivey [and not caused by her 
work]. Id. at 35." 
In Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting & Bodyworks, 128 Idaho 747, 918 P.2d 1192 (1996), 
it appeared that the Claimant was attempting to clean a ventilation stack at his place of work 
when he fell off the roof sustaining serious injury. 
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The Defendants contended that the Claimant's injury had been intentional, contending 
that the Claimant suffered from a paranoid psychosis which lead him to injuring himself 
intentionally. 
The Industrial Commission found that the Claimant had proven a prima facie case that 
his accident and injury were related to the duties of his employment but found that the 
Defendant's proof did not satisfy their burden of disproving the Claimant's case. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that once the Claimant offered a prima facie case 
satisfying the burden of proving that he had a compensable accident and injury under the 
Worker's Compensation law, the burden of proof shifted to the Defendant to prove every 
element of their defense. Interpreting Idaho Code § 72-208(1) which discusses willful and 
intentional injuries, the Court noted at follows: 
"To give the statute a reasonable construction requires that 'willful 
intention to injure himself' be deemed an affirmative defense the 
employer must prove. On the affirmative defenses in the realm of 
civil litigation are proven by the party asserting them, LR.C.P. 
8(c); see, e.g. Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498,503,788 P.2d 1321 
(1990) (Defendant has burden of proving every element necessary 
to establish affirmative defense of statute of limitation). Similarly 
here, it is reasonable to require that the bar to compensation be 
proven by the employer." 
Seamans, 128 Idaho at 752. 
Both Spivey and Seamans stand for the proposition that once a Claimant has offered proof 
which satisfies his or her burden of proof establishing a valid case under the Worker's 
Compensation law, the burden of proof shifts to the Defendant to offer proof to refute that 
offered by the Claimant. 
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Thus, the burden of proving that Dr. Parent's opinion was unsound or flawed in some 
manner rested with the Defendants. Appellant contends that the Defendants did not satisfy this 
burden of proof. 
Here, Claimant put forth testimony from his treating cardiologist, Dr. Parent. Dr. Parent 
stated that in his expert medical opinion, Claimant's heart attack occurred after his arrival at his 
Employer's premises. Claimant contends that through this testimony, he satisfied his initial 
burden of showing that the accident at issue occurred after his arrival at work. At this point, the 
burden of proof shifts. 
Despite Dr. Parent's unwavering medical testimony, the Defendant chose not to elicit 
testimony from an independent medical expert. In fact, the Defendant raised no argument as to 
the time when and place where the accident occurred. Instead, Defendant argued that Claimant 
never engaged in any "actual" work activities prior to his heart attack and was thus not entitled to 
benefits. (Def. Resp. Br. at 4). This legal argument was flatly denied by the Commission. (R p. 
25,~31). 
Defendants in this case did attempt to offer evidence through Dr. Parent himself in an 
effort to discredit and lessen the force of his opinion. It should be remembered that the 
Defendants started this process before the hearing by writing to Dr. Parent and suggesting to him 
that there were other causes, personal to the Claimant, which lead to his heart attack. (See, Joint 
Exhibit No. 13, pp. 3-6). Dr. Parent explained that while these causes may have had some 
causative affect on Claimant's heart attack, he still believed that the work-related activities in 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PG. 20 
which Claimant was engaged on the morning of November 15, 2009, were at least a 50% reason 
for his heart attack. (Joint Exhibit No. 12, pp. 2-4). 
At hearing, as Claimant testified to additional circumstances and other evidence was 
introduced, Defendants had additional information about Claimant's symptoms and statements 
which had been made about his symptoms by other witnesses. When this information was 
conveyed to Dr. Parent on his deposition, Dr. Parent dismissed these statements as medically 
insignificant. (See, Parent Depo., p. 54,11. 15-19.) 
Claimant contends that despite Defendants best efforts, therefore, Dr. Parent remained 
steadfast in his opinion that Claimant's heart attack was caused, at least 50%, solely by his 
working activities on the morning of November 15, 2009. 
3. The Commission's denial of benefits lacked the support of any substantial and 
competent evidence. 
In Idaho, when a Claimant sets forth expert medical testimony, the Commission must cite 
substantial and competent evidence upon which the rejection of the testimony is based. See, e.g., 
Hughen, 137 Idaho at 349. Specifically, "[u]nless some explanation is furnished for the 
disregard of all the uncontradicted testimony or other evidence in the record, the Commission 
may find its award reversed as arbitrary and unsupported." Larson's Workers' Compensation 
Law § 130.05[3] (2007). 
The Commission's grounds for rejecting Dr. Parent's uncontradicted expert testimony are 
twofold. First, the Commission relied on ambiguous testimony that "would suggest an onset of 
symptomatology prior to Claimant's arrival on the premises." (R p. 27, ~ 36). Secondly, the 
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Commission listed a variety of variables which, according to the Commission's Decision, were 
not considered by Dr. Parent in formulating his opinion on medical causation and thus rendered 
his opinion "materially flawed." (R p. 28, ~ 41). Claimant contends that in both instances, the 
Commission relied upon conjecture, speculation and evidence which had been dismissed as 
inconsequential. 
a. The Commission's reliance on ambiguous lay testimony to diminish Dr. Parent's 
expert medical testimony as to the onset of Claimant's heart attack was clearly 
erroneous. 
On appellate review, the Commission's conclusions on the credibility and weight of 
evidence are subject to reversal when the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Jensen v. City of 
Pocatello, l35 Idaho 406, 409, 18 P.3d 211 (2000). Here, the Commission had to evaluate 
evidence in order to reasonably locate in time when the Claimant's symptoms of a heart attack 
were manifest. As the Commission points out, the manifestation of symptoms would indicate 
when the actual arterial occlusion took place. (R p. 26, ~ 34). 
The only medical expert opinion as to the timing of the onset of Claimant's arterial 
occlusion came from Dr. Parent. In no uncertain terms, Dr. Parent said, "I think [the artery] 
closed when [h]e was walking up those stairs [at work], and it hit him very suddenly." (Parent 
Depo. p. 55, 11. 17-19). This testimony indicates that Dr. Parent, based on his knowledge and 
experience as a board certified cardiologist, believed that Claimant's heart attack took place after 
his arrival at work, on the steps of Unit 15. Importantly, Dr. Parent was given facts related to 
Claimant's pre and post-arrival activities in formulating this opinion. As Dr. Parent's 
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unwavering testimony indicates, he was willing to give a precise opinion as to when Claimant's 
cardiac artery was occluded and the heart attack was manifest. 
Despite Dr. Parent's clear and unequivocal testimony, the decision below points to two 
sources of testimony upon which it bases its denial of compensability in this case. First, in a 
telephone call while still recovering from heart surgery, Claimant told his superior at the prison 
that he felt unwell on his drive to work the morning of his heart attack. 
"Q. And then your second call, anything specific you remember 
about that as far as the nature of the call in general? 
A. Again, it was kind of a checkup, how are you doing? What's 
your recovery-you know, what's it been like. In one of the 
conversations, you know, Officer Henry was telling me that when 
he had come in to work that day he wasn't feeling well. And, you 
know, kind of-during the drive and things like that, he should 
have kind of paid attention to, I guess, his own feeling of-but that 
was after the fact. 
Q. And he was describing the heart attack that he'd suffered on 
November IS? 
A. Yeah. He was referring to the morning coming to work on the 
15th .... " 
(R pp. 11-12, ~ 6). 
As evident from this testimony, there is no indication that the Claimant's vague and 
unspecified feelings on his drive into work were in any way related to his heart. Claimant 
readily volunteered the fact that he felt a general sense of malaise when he drove into work on 
the morning of November 15,2009. (R p. 12, ~ 7). Reliance on this comment to discredit Dr. 
Parent's testimony regarding the onset of Claimant's heart attack is unreasonable. 
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It should be remembered that Dr. Parent specifically addressed Claimant's activities 
before he got to work on the morning of November 15, 2009, and unequivocally and 
emphatically testified that he thought that Claimant's heart attack occurred while he was going 
up the steps into Unit 15 at his work place. Dr. Parent based this testimony upon the sudden 
onset of Claimant's symptoms and the fact that he recovered just as suddenly when the occluded 
vein was cleared. (See, Parent Depo., pp. 51-55). Claimant herein contends that the decision 
below therefore attached medical significance to evidence without any medical importance. This 
evidentiary factor had been considered by Dr. Parent and dismissed as medically insignificant. 
The Industrial Commission therefore had no substantial or competent evidence to indicate that 
this particular evidentiary feature was of any significance. 
The second source of testimony used to discount Dr. Parent's medical opinion came from 
an unnamed coworker at the prison. Claimant made the following offhanded comment during 
his deposition: 
"A. [Spontaneously] I was reminded by one of my fellow workers 
there [at the Administration Building] that I didn't - - they told me 
I didn't look very good. 
Q. At this point when you were checking III with the shift 
lieutenant or his 
designee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So on the day in question someone that was assigned to that 
duty mentioned to you didn't look well? 
A. They said I didn't look very well. 
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Q. They reminded me. I had forgotten completely about it 
but ... [end of response)." 
(Rpp. 12-13, ~ 8). 
Significantly, the Defendant did not depose this unnamed coworker, nor did the 
Defendant elicit further clarification from the Claimant. Like the other comment about feeling 
unwell, Claimant would submit that any reliance on this ambiguous testimony is clearly 
erroneous. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguous nature of the comment, the significance of this comment 
was taken into account in the considered analysis of Dr. Parent. Dr. Parent wholly disregarded 
the comment by the unnamed coworker during his cross-examination. To be sure, after being 
asked about the statement by the unnamed coworker, Dr. Parent stated, "I think a nonmedical 
person looking at someone who's late to work and who's under stress might easily make a 
judgment on somebody's health. Mr. Henry is an anxious person who displays that anxiety on 
his sleeve and you see that in him." (Parent Depo. p. 54, 11. 15-19). Clear from this testimony, 
Dr. Parent accorded the ambiguous comment no medical significance. 
Claimant contends that the Commission's reliance on the two aforementioned ambiguous 
and rather vague comments to disregard and contradict Dr. Parent's expert medical opinion as to 
the onset of Claimant's heart attack was erroneous and without the support of substantial and 
competent evidence. Both of the comments relied upon by the Commission were vague, 
generalized and ambiguous. When Dr. Parent was asked about these two evidentiary points, he 
dismissed them as being medically insignificant. Dr. Parent did consider these elements and 
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testified that they did not change his opinion nor did they constitute evidence which impacted his 
opinion. (See, Parent Depo. pp. 54-55). 
Nonetheless, the Industrial Commission cited to these two evidentiary points as being 
significant and constituting a basis for disbelieving Dr. Parent's opinion. Claimant contends that 
the Industrial Commission committed reversible error by unreasonably relying upon evidence 
which has no medical significance based upon the only doctor's testimony in this record. The 
evidence relied upon by the Industrial Commission falls well below the substantial and 
competent standard upon which a factual finding must rest. 
b. The Commission's reasons for rmding Dr. Parent's opinion "materially flawed" 
with respect to the onset of Claimant's heart attack was not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record. 
As a threshold matter, it must be remembered that "[s]ubstantial and competent evidence 
is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 
685, 687, 963 P.2d 368, 370 (1998). Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence 
which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Id. 
The Decision of the Commission emphasizes that the Claimant did not look well when he 
got in to the first Administration Building at the Employer's premises and that Claimant was 
inconsistent about his actual state of symptomatology at the time he first arrived in the building 
at work. (R pp. 17-18, ~ 19; p. 23, ~ 24; p. 28, ~ 41). The Commission concludes that because 
Dr. Parent did not consider this information, as well as other non-work-related factors, his 
opinion is "materially flawed." (R p. 28, ~ 41). 
Claimant contends that Dr. Parent was asked about many of the factors which the 
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Commission considered and that Dr. Parent replied to the defense questions on all of these points 
convincingly. Dr. Parent testified that the points raised by the Defendant and the Commission 
did not change his opinion. 
"Q. (By Ms. Vaughan) Would your opinion be at all affected by 
evidence which suggested he appeared to be ill when he went 
through the check-in station, the first building he entered that day 
after coming from the parking lot? 
A. I think a nonmedical person looking at someone who's late to 
work and who's under stress might easily make a judgment on 
somebody's health. Mr. Henry is an anxious person who displays 
that anxiety on his sleeve and you see that in him. 
And when an artery closes - to give you an example. When an 
artery closes, somebody goes from feeling absolutely fine to dead 
or almost dead, and when that artery opens on the cath lab table, 
that gray ashen appearing and that pain goes away and their 
sweating stops. And they want sometimes to get up and go home, 
and ten minutes ago they were about dead. 
And so this process of the normal flow through the artery and 
everything is fine, to no flow through the artery and you're having 
a heart attack, to restoration at normal flow, can be in some people 
a very dramatic recovery. 
So you can go from being very unimpaired to being very impaired 
to being very unimpaired very rapidly sometimes. And Mr. Henry 
was a bit like that in the cath lab to me. He went from being 
diaphoretic, cold ashen to when that miery opened, to being, I feel 
good, I feel great, I'm so glad that the pains gone. So they recover 
very quickly. 
I don't think that artery closed when he was getting in the car that 
morning or when he drove from Caldwell to Boise. I think it 
closed when he was walking up those stairs, and it hit him very 
suddenly. 
For you to ask me what's the contribution of the cold morning 
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getting in the car and the drive to Boise is for me too fine a print to 
be so accurate to give you an opinion on what contribution - I just 
can't give that." 
(Parent Depo. at 54, 11. 10-25, p. 55, 11 1-24).3 (Emphasis Added) 
Claimant contends that this answer dramatically and conclusively demonstrates that the 
scenario described by the Commission did not change Dr. Parent's opinion and did not influence 
the opinion which he gave in response to Claimant's counsel. The Decision of the Commission 
discounts Dr. Parent's opinion because he did not take this into account when, in fact, Dr. Parent 
did take this into account and discounted it.4 The Commission's Decision that Dr. Parent's 
opinion must be discounted because he failed to take these other factors into account is therefore 
not supported by substantial or competent evidence. 
The Commission's Decision also indicates that there is no support in the record for the 
proposition that Claimant was cold as he walked from the first Administration Building to the 
3 To be precise, Dr. Parent is referring back to the following question posed by Defendants' counsel: 
"Q. (By Ms. Vaughn) Would your opinion with respect to causation change under a slightly 
different factual scenario, if the facts established that Mr. Henry commuted from Caldwell to his 
work; that on the morning in question he was aware he was running late while still in Caldwell 
prior to reporting for work at the correctional facility; that he entered a vehicle that had not been 
wanned up, that had been parked outside, presumably was exposed to the same temperatures in 
Caldwell, or close to the same temperatures, and on route to Boise, although in a vehicle, and was 
aware he was late during that commute, do you think any of those factors may have caused the 
onset of the myocardial infurction that morning?" 
(Parent Depo. atp. 51, 11. 6-20). 
4 Despite Dr. Parent's testimony regarding the onset of Claimant's symptoms, and his consideration of the 
conunents made by Claimant's coworker, the Commission made the following finding: 
"Dr. Parent was unaware that Claimant told Mr. Kimmel he suspected something was wrong on 
the drive to work or that a coworker thought he looked unwell on arrival at the Administration 
Building. He presumed that Claimant exhibited no onset symptoms until he reached Unit 15; 
however, the evidence in the record suggests Claimant may have been experiencing onset 
symptoms before then. Because Dr. Parent failed to consider this evidence, his opinion lacks 
foundation." 
(R p. 23, ~ 24) 
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second Administration Building on the morning at issue. 
"Finally, Dr. Parent testified that research has shown that cold 
temperature is implicated in contributing to the onset of 
myocardial infarction. Here, Claimant has testified that on the 
morning of November 15, 2009, it was "brisk." He stepped out of 
his Caldwell home, started his car and drove to the prison. The 
record does not reflect how Claimant was dressed, whether 
appropriately or inappropriately for the conditions. There is no 
testimony that even though it was cold outside, Claimant was 
himself cold. In fact, Claimant testified that he was comfortable. 
Claimant's Dep., p. 83. On balance, the evidence is insufficient to 
establish that Claimant was actually exposed to any risk of 
vasoconstriction due to cold temperatures. Even if he was, the 
evidence shows he was exposed to this risk both before and after 
his arrival at the premises." 
(R p. 28, ~ 40). 
It appears that the Commission - without any basis in the record - assumed that the 
Claimant needed to be physically cold from the weather because of inadequate clothing before 
the coldness factor became an issue. 
Claimant finds this assumption to be completely without any support in the record, 
serving only to cast unsupported doubt on a credible and informed medical opinion. Dr. Parent, 
when arriving at the only medical opinion on causation in this case, was made aware of the 
temperature on the morning in question and the Claimant's activities that exposed him to the 
cold weather. (Joint Exhibit 13 at 4.) At no point in Dr. Parent's opinion does he question the 
clothing worn by the Claimant or whether the Claimant felt physically cold, nor does he qualify 
his opinion based on those factors. Suffice it to say, Dr. Parent, a board certified cardiologist, 
was confident to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the cold weather was a 
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contributory factor in triggering Claimant's heart attack without further inquiry into the 
Claimant's attire or subjective feelings. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that these 
facts were necessary for the doctor to form a reliable medical opinion. 
Claimant contends that the morning temperature may indeed have been at play simply 
because Claimant was outside breathing in the cold air as he hurried from the first 
Administration Building to the second. A letter from the Defendant to Dr. Parent indicates that 
the outside temperature on the morning in question was only twenty-five degrees. (Joint Exhibit 
13 at 4.) 
Common sense indicates that the cold temperature would not have been such a factor as 
Claimant drove his warm car from Caldwell to Boise for forty-five minutes. On the other hand, 
breathing in the below-freezing air while hurrying from one Administration Building to the other 
over 400 yards would indeed expose Claimant to enough cold air to pose a problem. 
Again, Claimant would note that the Commission's Decision discounting the cold 
temperature is based upon an assumption, which is not based on any facts in this record. It is 
therefore not based on substantial or competent evidence. 
In summation, the Commission's finding that Dr. Parent's medical OpInIOn was 
materially flawed was arbitrary and unsupported. The very factors that were used to discredit 
Dr. Parent were both addressed by the cardiologist and properly considered. Therefore, the 
Commission committed reversible error by discrediting the testimony of Dr. Parent without 
citing to substantial and competent evidence in the record. 
Claimant would note that the Defendants in this case did their job admirably and 
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properly. Defense counsel asked Dr. Parent both in letters prior to the hearing and during his 
deposition about the factors set forth by the Industrial Commission. The Defendants asked Dr. 
Parent whether or not it mattered to him if the Claimant felt ill during his drive from Caldwell to 
the site of his employment and Dr. Parent explained that this was not a factor in his opinion. The 
Defendants asked Dr. Parent about whether or not it mattered to him that Claimant "appeared ill" 
when he first arrived at work. Dr. Parent explained that this was not important to him and was 
not medically significant. Dr. Parent explained about the cold weather and the influence of the 
inhalation of cold air on a person's cardiac system and Defendants had full opportunity to 
explore this factor both in letters and in correspondence. 
Defendants did their job in exploring all the other possible causes or factors which may 
have led Claimant to his heart attack and Dr. Parent specifically addressed these both before the 
hearing and in post-hearing depositions. 
Nonetheless, the Industrial Commission ignored Dr. Parent's explanations and assigned 
medical weight and importance to factors which had been dismissed by the physicians. The 
Industrial Commission's Decision therefore lacks substantial and competent evidence and should 
be reversed. 
VII. SUMMARY 
Appellant Joseph Henry suffered a major heart attack while making his way to his guard 
post on the morning of November 15, 2009. Mr. Henry came forward with substantial and 
competent evidence that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment, while 
engaged in work-related activities. Dr. Mark Parent, Mr. Henry's treating cardiologist, gave 
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uncontradicted medical testimony establishing the causal connection between the accident and 
Mr. Henry's workplace to a reasonable degree of medical probability. 
In denying Mr. Henry workers' compensation claim, the Industrial Commission applied 
an erroneous legal standard which required Mr. Henry to disprove every conceivable cause of his 
injury. Furthermore, the Industrial Commission failed to support several of its material findings 
on substantial and competent evidence. 
In accordance with the reasons set forth above, Claimant respectfully asks this Court for 
an order reversing the Decision of the Industrial Commission and remanding the matter to the 
Industrial Commission for reconsideration under the appropriate legal standard. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
DATED This -LJ day of November, 2011. 
Richard S. Owen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this c1 day of November, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was mailed, U. S~stage prepaid, to: 
Bridget A. Vaughan 
1001 N. 22nd St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
Richard S. Owen 
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